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Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions
from the Constitutional Unavailability
Requirement
Laird C. Kirkpatrick*
Then call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow
to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult and perplexing issues arising
under the sixth amendment is the relationship between the
confrontation clause ,and the law of hearsay. The clause guar-
antees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.' '2 The Supreme Court has interpreted "witnesses against"
a criminal defendant to include hearsay declarants 3 and has
held that the confrontation clause imposes some restrictions on
the use of hearsay in criminal cases.4
The 1970 decision of Dutton v. Evans5 established that
hearsay possessing sufficient "indicia of reliability" may be ad-
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon. The author expresses appre-
ciation to Richard D. Handley, a second-year student at the University of Ore-
gon Law School, for his research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. W. SHAKEsPEARE, RIcHARD II, act 1, sc. 1 (J.D. Wilson ed. 1939).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2.
3. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("The historical evidence leaves
little doubt, however, that the Clause was intended to exclude some hear-
say.").
If "witnesses against" were construed to mean only trial witnesses, the
clause would place no restrictions on the admissibility of hearsay. If the
clause, once interpreted to reach hearsay declarants, were applied literally, it
would bar all hearsay, except in those cases in which the declarant is produced
for cross-examination. The Court has rejected both extreme interpretations
and has recognized exceptions to the right of confrontation to accommodate
some forms of hearsay. See id at 63; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895).
5. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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mitted, at least in some circumstances, without violating the de-
fendant's right of confrontation. 6 During the 1970's, lower
courts struggled to define what types of hearsay met this con-
stitutionally mandated "reliability" standard.7
A decade later, in Ohio v. Roberts,8 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to add greater certainty to the "workaday world ' 9 of
criminal trials by holding that "[r]eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception."1 0 At the same time, however, the
Court created new uncertainties for prosecutors and lower
courts by announcing that "[i]n the usual case (including cases
where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defend-
ant."'1 1 In other words, if the hearsay declarant is not produced
for cross-examination, a showing of unavailability will normally
be required before the hearsay will be constitutionally
admissible.
The Court appeared not to recognize the sweeping poten-
6. Id. at 89. For a discussion of the status of confrontation after Dutton,
see Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process, 6
CONN. L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1974); Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the
Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1405 (1972); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151, 183 (1978);
Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 54-57 (1975); Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Di-
lemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 38 (1972); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the
Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 76, 81 (1971); Westen, The Future of
Confrontation, 7 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (1979); Younger, Confrontation
and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 32, 38-41
(1973); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 188 (1971).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir.) (affidavits
from official stating that defendant had never worked for the CIA had suffi-
cient indicia of reliability), cert denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); United States v.
Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 44-45 (2d Cir.) (coconspirator's statement had indicia of
reliability), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Wigerman, 549
F.2d 1192, 1194 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977) (business records found reliable); United
States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1975) (sufficient indicia of relia-
bility found for declaration against penal interest), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971
(1976); Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 345-48 (6th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric diagno-
sis in medical record not bearing the name of the author or his qualifications
does not have sufficient indicia of reliability), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972);
State v. Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 530, 484 P.2d 368, 372 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (excited
utterance of child witness to murder lacks indicia of reliability).
8. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
9. Id. at 66.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 65.
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tial ramifications of such an unavailability requirement. If
broadly applied, it would severely restrict the use by prosecu-
tors of numerous hearsay exceptions that have traditionally
been available.12 The vast majority of hearsay exceptions,
under both the common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
do not contain a requirement that the unavailability of the de-
clarant be shown. 13
The unavailability requirement announced in Roberts
raises doubts regarding the constitutional status in criminal
prosecutions of the twenty-four hearsay exceptions set forth in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803,14 and its state counterparts,'5
which purport to apply regardless of the availability of the de-
clarant.16 The unavailability requirement also calls into ques-
tion the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C),
(D), and (E),'7 which admit the statements of agents and cocon-
12. For example, a showing of unavailability of the declarant is not possi-
ble with respect to many types of business and official records, yet production
of the declarant would negate the utility of the exception. See Lilly, Notes On
the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 225
(1984) ("[T]he broad application of a constitutional rule of preference [for in-
court testimony] is likely to make profound changes in criminal trials.").
13. The twenty-four exceptions set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 803 apply re-
gardless of the availability of the declarant. Only the five exceptions listed in
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) require a showing of unavailability. Admissions by agents
or coconspirators may also be received under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D),
and (E) without a showing of unavailability. At common law only a minority
of the hearsay exceptions require a showing of unavailability. See C. McCoR-
MICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 253, at 753 (3d ed. 1984).
14. A direct constitutional clash is avoided by the introductory wording of
Fed. R. Evid. 803, which does not state that evidence satisfying an exception
listed therein is admissible, but merely that it is "not excluded by the hearsay
rule." The Advisory Committee's note to article VIII of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states:
In recognition of the separateness of the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule, and to avoid inviting collisions between them or be-
tween the hearsay rule and other exclusionary principles, the excep-
tions set forth in Rules 803 and 804 are stated in terms of exemption
from the general exclusionary mandate of the hearsay rule, rather
than in positive terms of admissibility.
FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, advisory committee note.
15. Twenty-seven states, the military, and Puerto Rico have adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in various forms. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, Note on State Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence; Military Rules of Evidence T-1 (1985).
16. FED. R. EVID. 803.
17. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if . . . (2) . . .The statement is offered
against a party and is ... (C) a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement
by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
1986]
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spirators without requiring a showing of unavailability.' 8 The
five hearsay exceptions listed in Federal Rule of Evidence 80419
are relatively unaffected because they are already subject to an
unavailability requirement within the rule that in most cases is
sufficiently stringent to satisfy constitutional standards.20
During the 1980's, lower courts have had difficulty applying
the Roberts unavailability requirement to hearsay offered
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
The provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and (B), admitting personal
or adoptive admissions of criminal defendants are not affected because defend-
ants are unavailable as a matter of law to be called as prosecution witnesses.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 130, at 315.
The provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) admitting certain prior inconsis-
tent statements, prior consistent statements, and prior statements of identifi-
cation also presumably pass constitutional muster because these statements
may be received only if "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1).
18. Some courts addressing the impact of Roberts upon coconspirator ad-
missions have held that unavailability must be shown, even though such state-
ments are defined as not hearsay by the Federal Rules. See, e.g., United States
v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 819 (3d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 2653 (1985)
(No. 84-1580); United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802 (9th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981). Other
courts have held that compliance with the rule admitting a coconspirator's
statements, Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E), automatically satisfies the confronta-
tion clause, without discussing the implications of Roberts. See, e.g., United
States v. Molt, 772 U.S. 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. McLernon, 746
F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982); see also United States v. Kiefer, 694
F.2d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1982) ("declarations admitted in conformity with the
coconspirator rule generally do not violate a defendant's confrontation right,
absent some unusual circumstance"). See generally Lilly, supra note 12. Pro-
fessor Graham Lilly states: "Vicarious admissions, including those of a co-con-
spirator, may constitute nonhearsay under the Federal Rules, but they surely
come within the inner core of Constitutional concern. In short, Roberts applies
full force." Id at 229.
19. Fed. R. Evid. 804 establishes exceptions for former testimony, state-
ments under belief of impending death, statements against interest, and state-
ments of personal or family history, as well as a residual exception. FED. R.
EVID. 804.
20. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) provides:
[Vol. 70:665
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under various exceptions.21 A recurring problem has been de-
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the de-
clarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3) or (4), his attendance or testi-
mony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, re-
fusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the pro-
curement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
FED. R. EVID 804(a).
Subpart (1) should satisfy the constitutional unavailability requirement if
the exemption on ground of privilege is granted. Some commentators, how-
ever, argue that the interests protected by evidentiary privileges should not be
deemed automatically superior to the confrontation rights of criminal defend-
ants. See, e.g., Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified The-
ory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567, 581 n.38 (1978);
Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defend-
ant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1484-
85 (1975). There is also a related argument that the prosecutor has an obliga-
tion to grant immunity to defense witnesses to prevent them from asserting
the privilege against self-incrimination, thus making them available to testify
at trial. To date, courts have been generally unreceptive to this contention. 4
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 486, at 1070-71 (1980).
Subparts (2) and (3) should also satisfy the constitutional unavailability
standard. When a declarant's hearsay statement is being offered and unavaila-
bility is claimed under subpart (3) merely by virtue of the declarant's testi-
mony as to the existence of a memory loss, it can be argued, however, that the
confrontation clause may require some testing of that claim.
Subpart (4) contains the greatest potential conflict with the confrontation
clause because the duration of a medical disability that would be sufficient to
establish a witness's unavailability in a civil case may be less than that which
would be required to protect the right of confrontation in a criminal case.
Courts can of course avoid the potential conflict by interpreting the rule more
stringently in criminal cases.
Subpart (5) not only satisfies but may go beyond the requirements of the
confrontation clause. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212 (1972) (no ap-
parent obligation to attempt to obtain the appearance of a witness by "other
reasonable means" once the witness has been shown to be beyond the reach of
process).
It should be noted that Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) does not purport to be an ex-
haustive listing of the grounds of evidentiary unavailability. If a court bases a
finding of unavailability on an unlisted ground, such as the age of the potential
witness, a separate constitutional analysis of the sufficiency of this ground will
be required.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1985) (un-
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termining what exemptions from the unavailability require-
ment should be recognized. The Roberts Court noted that the
unavailability requirement is not absolute and that certain ex-
emptions will be allowed, for example when "the utility of trial
confrontation [is] remote. '22
This Article traces the historical and theoretical develop-
ment of the unavailability requirement and identifies criteria
for evaluating when exemptions from the unavailability re-
quirement should be recognized by the courts. The Article
then analyzes various hearsay exceptions recognized by the
Federal Rules of Evidence in light of these criteria and con-
cludes that many varieties of hearsay, particularly documentary
hearsay, generally should be exempt from the unavailability
requirement.
I. GENESIS OF THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
The requirement of showing unavailability or producing
the hearsay declarant for cross-examination at trial has been a
recurring theme in two lines of Supreme Court decisions ex-
tending back to the nineteenth century. For this reason, Ohio
v. Roberts may have appeared to mark little departure from es-
tablished precedent. Closer examination, however, reveals that
these earlier lines of cases do not provide authority for the
sweeping unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts.
The first line of cases involved hearsay that was subject to
cross-examination at a prior hearing and that was received
under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.23 In
availability must be shown in order to admit evidence under coconspirator ex-
ception); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1984)
(unavailability must be shown in order to admit evidence under business
records exception under facts of the case); United States v. Panas, 738 F.2d 278,
283-84 (8th Cir. 1984) (unavailability need not be shown to admit evidence
under coconspirator exception); United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 24 n.4
(2d Cir. 1983) (open question whether certificate admissible pursuant to Fed.
R. Evid. 803(10) would satisfy Roberts requirements); United States v. Wash-
ington, 688 F.2d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1982) (business records should not be intro-
duced upon retrial without compliance with the Roberts test); United States v.
Hans, 684 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Clearly Roberts does not support ex-
clusion of the instant checks" which were admissible pursuant to Rule 803(6)
and 803(8)); People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 680-82 (Colo. 1983) (unavailability
must be shown when evidence is sought to be admitted under the excited ut-
terance exception to the hearsay rule).
22. 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
23. The former testimony exception is currently codified as Rule 804(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
[Vol. 70:665
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1878, in the case of Reynolds v. United States,24 the government
had shown that it was unable to subpoena the defendant's wife,
allegedly because of her concealment by the defendant. The
Court therefore affirmed admission of the record of her testi-
mony at the defendant's first trial against the defendant at his
second trial.2 5 Similarly, in the 1895 case of Mattox v. United
States,26 the Court approved admission of a court reporter's
notes of prior testimony given by two prosecution witnesses at
the defendant's earlier trial, because the record indicated the
witnesses had subsequently died.27 Five years later, however,
in Motes v. United States,28 the Court held it was error to admit
a prosecution witness's preliminary hearing testimony when
the witness's unavailability was due to the government's negli-
gence in allowing him to escape from custody.29
The leading recent case establishing unavailability as a con-
stitutional prerequisite to the admission of former testimony in
a criminal case is Barber v. Page.3 0 In Barber, the trial court
admitted a transcript of a codefendant's preliminary hearing
testimony that inculpated Barber.31 The transcript was admit-
ted after a showing that the codefendant, at the time of trial,
was incarcerated in a federal prison in another state.32 Apply-
ing state evidence law, the court found the codefendant suffi-
ciently unavailable to justify admitting the transcript under the
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.33 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that regardless of whether
the showing of unavailability was sufficient to meet state evi-
dentiary standards, it was insufficient to meet the requirements
of the confrontation clause.3 The witness was beyond the sub-
poena power of the state and unable to return voluntarily, but
24. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
25. I& at 158. The Court stated:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he
should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness
is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if
competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he
has kept away.
Id
26. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
27. Id. at 244.
28. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
29. Id. at 471.
30. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
31. Id. at 720.
32. Id.
33. Id-
34. Id at 721.
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
this was not a sufficient showing of constitutional unavailabil-
ity. The Court stated: "[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for pur-
poses of the foregoing exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a
good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial."35 The Court
discussed various methods state authorities could have used to
produce witnesses incarcerated out-of-state, citing in particular
the possibility of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is-
sued by a federal or state judge.36
Mancusi v. Stubbs,37 decided four years later, elaborated
upon the nature of the government's "good faith" obligation to
produce available prosecution witnesses. In Mancusi, the pros-
ecution witness had become a permanent resident of Sweden by
the time of the second trial. The state trial judge found the
witness unavailable and admitted his testimony from the first
trial. A federal court granted defendant's habeas corpus peti-
tion, finding an insufficient showing of the witness's unavaila-
bility. Although not retreating from recognition of a
constitutional unavailability requirement, the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he State of Tennessee, so far as this record shows, was powerless to
compel his attendance at the second trial, either through its own pro-
cess or through established procedures depending on the voluntary
assistance of another government.... We therefore hold that the
predicate of unavailability was sufficiently stronger here than in Bar-
ber that a federal habeas court was not warranted in upsetting the de-
termination of the state trial court as to [the witness's]
unavailability.3 8
35. -Id. at 724-25.
36. Id. at 724. The Court noted that "the possibility of a refusal is not the
equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff." Id (quoting Barber v. Page, 381
F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1966) (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
37. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
38. Id. at 212-13. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court
took a different approach, holding that unavailability need not be shown if the
witness is produced at trial. In Green, after a prosecution witness claimed a
lapse of memory during direct examination, the prosecutor offered his testi-
mony given at the preliminary hearing. The evidence was received under a
new provision of the California Evidence Code, which allowed prior inconsis-
tent statements not only for impeachment but also as substantive evidence.
Reversing the ruling of the California Supreme Court that this provision vio-
lated the confrontation clause, the Court stated:
If [the declarant] had died or was otherwise unavailable, the Confron-
tation Clause would not have been violated by admitting his testi-
mony given at the preliminary hearing .... [A]s a constitutional
matter, it is untenable to construe the Confrontation Clause to permit
the use of prior testimony to prove the State's case where the declar-
ant never appears, but to bar that testimony where the declarant is
[Vol. 70:665
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This line of cases demonstrates that one function of the
confrontation clause is to impose a rule of preference for live
testimony over transcripts so that the trier of fact will have an
opportunity to evaluate the witnesses' demeanor. The clause
compels a witness "to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief."39
If unavailability of the declarant is shown, however, the
Court will allow receipt of prior cross-examined testimony,40
because three of the four concerns of the confrontation clause 41
are satisfied by such hearsay. The witness has testified under
oath, in the defendant's presence, and, most important, has
been subject to cross-examination by the defendant. Only the
opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor is lacking. In
Mattox, the Court described this as an "incidental benefit" that
must be sacrificed in order to protect the "rights of the public"
to have criminals brought to justice in cases where "death has
closed the mouth" of an essential witness.42
present at the trial, exposed to the defendant and the trier of fact, and
subject to cross-examination.
I&i at 166-67.
39. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
40. The Court has not held that cross-examination in a proceeding in
which the defendant has a different motive would be sufficient. The Court has
also not resolved whether a mere opportunity to cross-examine will necessar-
ily satisfy confrontation requirements. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-73
(1979).
41. In Roberts, the Court commented that "a primary interest secured by
[the provision] is the right of cross-examination." Id at 63 (quoting Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). In a footnote, the Roberts Court cited three
additional purposes of confrontation: first, it draws "out discrediting de-
meanor to be viewed by the factfinder;" second, it "undoubtedly makes it more
difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person is an accused and
present at trial;" and third, it "insures that the witness will give his statements
under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury." Roberts,
448 U.S. at 63 n.6.
42. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). The Court stated:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never
lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the
witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read,
he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the wit-
ness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection.
But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their op-
eration and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say
that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of
a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed
1986]
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These former-testimony cases do not provide authority for
the sweeping unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts.
The Court had never previously extended the constitutional
standard of unavailability developed in the former testimony
cases to include all forms of hearsay. Former testimony is one
of the few exceptions to the hearsay rule for which evidence
law itself requires a showing of unavailability of the declar-
ant.4 3 In cases where the prosecutor is already required to show
unavailability under controlling evidence rules, there may be
little or no additional burden involved in satisfying constitu-
tional standards of unavailability. It is, however, a substantial
additional burden for prosecutors to show unavailability when
no such showing is otherwise required. In the latter instance,
the constitutional unavailability requirement can serve as a
practical bar to the use of hearsay exceptions well established
under applicable rules of evidence.4
The second line of confrontation cases involved situations
in which the hearsay declarant was not previously subject to
cross-examination. In such cases, a requirement that available
declarants be produced at trial furthers all four of the interests
protected by the confrontation clause, not merely the interest
in having the demeanor of prosecution witnesses evaluated by
the trier of fact. Because uncross-examined hearsay is more
suspect, the Court has not approved automatic admission of
such hearsay, even if a showing of unavailability is made. Thus,
with respect to uncross-examined hearsay, the confrontation
clause can operate as a rule of exclusion rather than merely as
a rule of preference.
In Pointer v. Texas,45 the trial court admitted the transcript
of a prosecution witness's testimony at a preliminary hearing.
The Supreme Court found a violation of the defendant's right
to confront witnesses against him. The Court held that the de-
fendant did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the witness prior to trial because the defendant was not repre-
sented by counsel at the preliminary hearing.4 6 Therefore, pro-
the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional pro-
tection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares
that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order
that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.
Id.
43. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1); C. McCORMICK, supra note 13, § 255, at
761-62.
44. See supra note 12.
45. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
46. Id at 407-08.
[Vol. 70:665
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duction of the witness for cross-examination at trial was
required.
In Douglas v. Alabama,47 the prosecutor had been permit-
ted to read to the jury a document purporting to be an accom-
plice's written confession, which inculpated the defendant,
under the guise of refreshing the witness's recollection.48 The
Court found that this "created a situation in which the jury
might improperly infer both that the statement had been made
and that it was true. ' 49 The accomplice could not be cross-ex-
amined regarding the statement because he asserted the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 50 The absence of an opportunity
for cross-examination at trial caused the Court to find a viola-
tion of the right of confrontation, even though the hearsay
statements were not offered directly into evidence against the
accused.51
Similarly, in Bruton v. United States,52 a codefendant's con-
fession that implicated the defendant was offered at a joint
trial, although subject to a limiting instruction that it was not
to be considered against the defendant.5 3 Because the jury
might disregard this instruction and because the codefendant,
having refused to take the stand, was not subject to cross-exam-
ination regarding the confession, the Court found the defend-
ant's right of confrontation had been violated.M
In California v. Green,55 in addition to former testimony,56
the prosecutor offered evidence of inculpatory statements that
47. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
48. Id. at 416.
49. Id at 419.
50. Id. at 416.
51. Id at 419.
52. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
53. Id. at 123-24.
54. Id at 126; cf. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (when defendant
has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and supports the confession
of a nontestifying codefendant, the admission of the confessions, with proper
limiting instructions, does not violate the confrontation clause); Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971) (Bruton not controlling when codefendant
takes stand, denies inculpatory statement, and testifies favorably to defendant.
"Bruton, in other words, is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay state-
ment is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for 'full and effec-
tive' cross-examination."); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (when
confessions of three codefendants were admitted at trial, Bruton violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since one of the three took the stand and
was subject to cross-examination).
55. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
56. See supra note 38.
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a prosecution witness made to a police officer prior to trial.5 7
The Court held that these hearsay statements could not be re-
ceived in evidence unless the witness was able to be cross-ex-
amined regarding them at trial.58 The Court remanded the case
for a determination of whether the claimed memory lapse by
the witness regarding the events that were the subject of his
statements was sufficient to deprive the defendant of the right
of confrontation. 59
In Green, it appeared that the Court might be moving to-
ward a cross-examination requirement for all hearsay state-
ments by available declarants. 60 The Court, however, went
only so far as to hold that if the statement were subject to
cross-examination either when made or at trial, the confronta-
tion clause would be satisfied.61 Six months later, in Dutton v.
Evans,62 the court retreated from any inference in Green that
the sixth amendment imposes an absolute bar to uncross-ex-
amined hearsay from available declarants. The Court found no
confrontation violation in the admission of the hearsay state-
ment of a coconspirator against the defendant,63 even though
the statement was not cross-examined when made or at trial.64
Moreover, the Court was untroubled by the fact that the prose-
cutor had made no showing of the unavailability of the hearsay
declarant.65
This second line of cases, involving uncross-examined hear-
say, also fails to provide sufficient authority for an unavailabil-
ity requirement of the scope announced in Roberts. None of
these cases held that all hearsay not cross-examined at a prior
proceeding must be subject to cross-examination at trial if the
declarant is available. In fact, in other cases the Court has ap-
proved the admission of uncross-examined hearsay without a
57. Green, 399 U.S. at 151.
58. Id. at 164.
59. Id. at 170. On remand, the California Supreme Court found that the
memory lapse did not impair Green's right of confrontation. Green v. State, 3
Cal. 3d 981, 989-91, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499-500, 479 P.2d 998, 1003-04, cert dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
60. See id. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. Id at 164.
62. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
63. Under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a coconspirator's statements are de-
fined as not hearsay. See supra note 17. The Federal Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, were not in effect at the time of the Dutton decision, and coconspirator
statements were considered hearsay at common law. See infra note 214 and
accompanying text.
64. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87-88.
65. Id at 88-89.
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showing of unavailability at trial.66
Thus neither line of cases described above is authority for
the sweeping unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts.
Certainly the lower courts prior to 1980 did not interpret the
applicable precedents as imposing such a broad unavailability
requirement. A wide variety of hearsay was regularly admitted
against criminal defendants without requiring either production
of the declarant or a showing of declarant unavailability.67 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a number of these cases, 68
thereby reinforcing the widespread view that a showing of un-
availability was not essential for many forms of hearsay to be
admissible in criminal cases.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITING THEORY
The proposal of a constitutional unavailability requirement
applicable to all varieties of hearsay was developed most explic-
66. In Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), the Court approved a
clerk's hearsay certification of the accuracy of a court record even though
there was no showing of unavailability. The Court held that the confrontation
clause did not prohibit the introduction of "[d]ocumentary evidence to estab-
lish collateral facts, admissible under the common law." Id& at 330. Similarly,
in Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974), the Court approved intro-
duction of a court reporter's transcript to prove what testimony was given at a
prior hearing, without requiring that the reporter be produced or shown to be
unavailable. Id- at 220 n.11; cf. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48
(1926) (approving admission of letters, bank deposit slips, and book entries
although the Court apparently took the view that the various exhibits either
were not offered for a hearsay purpose or qualified as admissions).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 614 F.2d 295, 296-97 (1st Cir. 1980)
(catalog admitted to show value of stolen lighters); United States v. Beecroft,
608 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1979) (credit report of Dun and Bradstreet admit-
ted); United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979) (college tran-
script admitted); United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1978)
(manufacturer's statement of origin of automobile admitted); United States v.
Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1978) (car rental payment slip admitted);
United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 488 (5th Cir. 1978) (pocket calendar ad-
mitted); United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146, 154 (8th Cir. 1978) (records of
out-of-state manufacture of firearms admitted); United States v. Wigerman,
549 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1977) (motel registrations, car rentals, and air-
line shipments admitted); United States v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 986-87 (8th Cir.
1976) (lease agreement involving a stolen car admitted); United States v. John-
son, 515 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Red Book" admitted to show value of
automobile).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (affidavit that de-
fendant had never worked for CIA), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); United
States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.) (banking records), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 933 (1978); United States v. Lloyd, 431 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.) (official
records), cert denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1970); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264
(9th Cir.) (alien registration documents), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
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itly by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in California v.
Green.6 9 Justice Harlan criticized the past approach of the
Court as "indiscriminately [equating] 'confrontation' with
'cross-examination.' "70 As an alternative, he set forth his view
that "the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce
any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a
criminal trial."1'
Less than six months later, however, Justice Harlan repu-
diated this view. In his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Ev-
ans,72 he stated:
Nor am I now content with the position I took in concurrence in
California v. Green ....
A rule requiring production of available witnesses would signifi-
cantly curtail development of the law of evidence to eliminate the ne-
cessity for production of declarants where production would be
unduly inconvenient and of small utility to a defendant. Examples
which come to mind are the Business Records Act ... and the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule for official statements, learned treatises, and
trade reports.
73
A number of commentators, although supportive of Justice
Harlan's original proposal that an unavailability requirement
be made a component of confrontation jurisprudence, have
shared his subsequent apprehensions that an across-the-board
unavailability requirement would unduly limit the prosecu-
tion's use of hearsay in criminal cases.74 Therefore, several of
69. 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Id-
71. Id at 174 (emphasis in original).
72. 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id at 95-96.
74. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 6, at 192 ("Justice Harlan's concern [in
repudiating the unavailability requirement] that the confrontation clause not
require production of all available witnesses is also well taken."); Read, supra
note 6, at 43 ("[R]equiring production of available witnesses ... would hamper
exceptions that excuse witnesses when their presence would be inconvenient
or of small utility to the defendant."); Westen, supra note 20, at 615. Professor
Westen states:
I believe that Justice Harlan was closer to the mark the first time. To
be sure, there is something troubling about treating confrontation as a
strict rule of preference; the prosecution can hardly be expected to
present each and every item of evidence in the form of direct testi-
mony simply because the declarant happens to be available to be pro-
duced in person. Surely there are some kinds of evidence, such as
business records and statements from learned treatises, that should be
admissible in hearsay or documentary form without violating the con-
frontation clause.
Id.; cf. Baker, supra note 6, at 542 ("Although there appears to be some histor-
ical support for the availability requirement, the history is at best so scanty
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these writers have proposed interpretations of the confronta-
tion clause that would narrow the meaning of "witnesses
against" a criminal defendant and thereby allow certain forms
of hearsay to be admitted without a showing of unavailability.
Professor Kenneth Graham proposed that "witnesses
against" a defendant, within the meaning of the confrontation
clause, be limited to "principal witnesses" for the prosecution,
such as those necessary for the prosecution to survive a motion
for acquittal based upon insufficiency of proof. 75 Hearsay state-
ments by other declarants would not be excludable under the
sixth amendment.76
Although most observers would agree that important hear-
say should be treated differently from unimportant hearsay for
purposes of confrontation analysis, the difficulty is defining
which hearsay declarants are "principal witnesses." Sometimes
hearsay necessary to avoid a directed judgment of acquittal has
far less significance in determining the outcome of a trial than
hearsay that is cumulative or corroborative but still of great
persuasive impact. 77 This approach would also create the
anomaly that a defendant would have no sixth amendment
right to cross-examine a nonprincipal witness, even though that
witness has testified against him.
Professor Peter Westen suggested that "witnesses against"
a defendant be limited to available declarants "whose state-
ments the prosecution introduces into evidence against the ac-
cused and whom the prosecution can reasonably expect the
defendant to wish to cross-examine at that time. s7 8 If it is not
reasonable to expect the defendant to wish to cross-examine
the hearsay declarant, then any right of the defendant to have
the witness produced would be based on the compulsory pro-
that it is important that it not be used to interpret the clause in a manner that
will have a rigidifying effect on future liberalization of the hearsay rules.").
75. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRlm. L. BULL. 99, 129 (1972).
76. 1d.
77. For example, a city directory might be introduced to establish that the
crime occurred within the jurisdiction of the court, or a certificate might be
received to prove that a bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, an essential element of a federal bank robbery prosecution.
Cross-examination of such hearsay would seem far less significant than cross-
examination of statements in an affidavit by an alleged eyewitness identifying
the defendant as the bank robber, even though there is sufficient other evi-
dence of identity to avoid a directed judgment of acquittal.
78. Westen, supra note 6, at 1206-07 (1979); see Westen, supra note 20, at
617-18.
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cess clause rather than the confrontation clause.79
It is unclear, however, why a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right should be defined by the prosecutor's state of mind.
Such an approach could present serious practical concerns and
invite defense stratagems to evade the limitations it provides.80
An objective measure of the boundaries of confrontation would
be easier for judges to apply.81
Professor Michael Graham proposed that "witnesses
against" a defendant be limited to those witnesses who testify
in court on behalf of the prosecution or who have made state-
ments that are "accusatory" of the defendant.8 2  A nonac-
cusatory hearsay statement would not be excludable under the
confrontation clause even if the available declarant were not
produced, but it would still have to satisfy due process
standards . 3
This proposal presents two difficulties. The first is deter-
mining when a statement is "accusatory. '8 4 The second is the
79. Westen, supra note 6, at 1207 n.86 (1979).
80. What if the defendant notified the prosecutor in advance of trial of a
desire to cross-examine all hearsay declarants? Could the prosecutor "reason-
ably" disregard such a request? On what basis? Would this constitute imper-
missible prosecutorial second-guessing of defense strategy? Should the
prosecutor or the court make the determination of whether the defendant has
a legitimate basis for seeking to have the hearsay declarant produced for cross-
examination? If the court should make the determination, why consider the
state of mind of the prosecutor at all?
81. It can be argued that the standard adopted by the Court in Roberts
represents a more objective version of Professor Westen's proposal. A judicial
conclusion that "the utility of trial confrontation [is] remote" is in essence a
finding that the defendant lacks a reasonable basis for seeking to cross-ex-
amine the hearsay declarant. The approach proposed by Westen will generally
produce the same results as the criteria proposed in this Article. See infra
textual discussion beginning at note 93. Westen states: "The same is true of
business records, trade reports, treatises, and other regularly maintained
forms of evidence; the defendant will ordinarily have no interest in examining
those who write or compile them, and the burden of producing the writers or
compilers may properly shift to the defendant." Westen, supra note 20, at 618-
19.
82. Graham, supra note 6, at 192.
83. Id at 195-97.
84. Graham states that a statement is "accusatory" if the declarant knew
or could reasonably anticipate that the statement would assist the government
in apprehending or prosecuting a person for a crime. See id. at 193-94. Deter-
mining what use of a statement the declarant could reasonably anticipate at
the time the statement was made would present serious practical difficulties
for courts.
This definition may also be both overinclusive and underinclusive. It
would include a certificate by an Internal Revenue Service employee, offered
in a tax evasion prosecution, stating that there is no record of tax returns hay-
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fact that "nonaccusatory" hearsay statements can sometimes
have enormous persuasive impact and be the decisive factor in
an adjudication of guilt.8 5 To exempt such statements from the
right of confrontation may be too narrow a reading of the sixth
amendment.
Although the Roberts opinion cited each of these writers in
a footnote,8 6 the Court refused to adopt any of their proposed
interpretations, perhaps because of the difficulties described.
Instead, the Court stated that "we have found no commentary
suggesting that the Court has misidentified the basic interests
to be accommodated."8 7 Therefore, it pronounced that "we re-
ject the invitation to overrule a near-century of jurispru-
dence,"88s without recognizing the apparent extension of that
jurisprudence inherent in the comprehensive unavailability re-
quirement. The Court indicated that it favored continuation of
the approach it has followed since Mattox v. United States,8 9
whereby the right of confrontation must be balanced against
"considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case."9 0 The Roberts Court, however, had difficulty articulating
the balance that must be struck. It stated as a broad proposi-
tion that "when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-ex-
amination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires
a showing that he is unavailable."9 1 Then, in a terse and equiv-
ocal footnote, the Court added the following qualification: "A
demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always re-
quired. In Dutton v. Evans, for example, the Court found the
utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require
ing been filed by the defendant for specified years, even though there is little
need to confront such a declarant. It would appear to exclude directly inculpa-
tory statements made by a coconspirator to a government informant who was
not expected ever to repeat such statements, even though there is considerable
justification for allowing cross-examination of such a declarant.
85. For example, an entirely nonaccusatory hearsay statement that places
the defendant at the scene of the crime may be the crucial piece of evidence
that causes the jury to convict. Professor Graham cites the example of an ex-
cited utterance by a bystander to a bank robber-"Bill Bumber, please don't
shoot me"--as being nonaccusatory, outside the confrontation clause, and ad-
missible without producing the declarant or showing unavailability. I& at 194-
95. It is doubtful that a defendant convicted on the basis of such identification
evidence could be persuaded that the hearsay declarant was not a witness
against him.
86. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980).
87. Id- at 68 n.9.
88. Id-
89. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
90. Id at 243.
91. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
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the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness. '92
Thus, the Court appears to have found no satisfactory way
of resolving the confrontation/hearsay dilemma by reinter-
preting the text of the sixth amendment. Instead, the Court
has adopted a pragmatic approach, using the "utility of trial
confrontation" 93 to determine whether an exemption from the
unavailability requirement will be recognized.
III. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING EXEMPTIONS
FROM THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
One difficulty with the Roberts formulation is that it repre-
sents more a conclusion than a standard. On what basis should
a court determine that the utility of trial confrontation is re-
mote? Lower courts will need specific criteria against which to
measure various forms of hearsay in order to determine
whether an exemption from the unavailability requirement is
justified. It is suggested that there are four criteria-centrality,
reliability, susceptibility to testing by cross-examination, and
the adequacy of alternatives to cross-examination-that are the
most appropriate factors against which to measure various
forms of hearsay.94
A. CENTRALITY
The utility of confrontation will vary depending upon the
92. Id. at 65 n.7 (citation omitted). This footnote cited two law review ar-
ticles: Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1,
43, 49 (1979) and The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 194-95,
197-98 (1971). These articles, although providing some insight into the think-
ing of the Court, do not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory for defin-
ing what exemptions should be recognized from the unavailability
requirement. In his article, Professor Frank Read stated that a rule of un-
availability would "hamper exceptions that excuse witnesses when their pres-
ence would be inconvenient or of small utility to the defendant." Read, supra
at 43. He also posed the questions:
Can the unavailability of the witness, under the facts, be excused be-
cause the inconvenience caused by producing him (as in business-
records-exception cases), outweighs any possible benefit his presence
could afford the accused? Is the witness a minor witness called to
supply a technical, basically uncontested detail as opposed to a key
prosecution witness?
Id. at 49. The second cited article observed: "The defendant is likely to waive
his right to cross-examine the declarant in cases where the hearsay involves
only perfunctory collateral matters or appears particularly reliable." The
Supreme Court, 1970 Tern, supra, at 195.
93. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980).
94. Authority for recognition of these factors can be found in Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See infra textual discussion beginning note 103.
[Vol. 70:665
UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
extent to which the hearsay statement bears directly on the
central issues of the case. Cross-examination is less significant
in circumstances in which the hearsay relates only to minor,
collateral, or undisputed issues, or is merely cumulative evi-
dence on a point already well established by other evidence.
Experienced trial lawyers do not find it necessary to cross-ex-
amine every witness, particularly when those witnesses have
testified only to tangential matters. A leading text on trial tac-
tics states:
The decision whether or not to cross-examine a particular witness,
and to what extent and with what aims and methods, calls for ap-
praising the advantages and disadvantages and accepting a calculated
risk.... That lawsuits are sometimes lost in cross-examination is
reason enough to beware of an unyielding rule that you cross-examine
every witness.95
B. RELIABILITY
Reliability has long been viewed as the primary justifica-
tion for recognizing exceptions to the hearsay rule.9 6 It is also
an appropriate factor to use in determining exemptions from
the unavailability requirement. The circumstances assuring
trustworthiness serve as a partial substitute for cross-examina-
tion. A primary purpose of confrontation is to protect a defend-
ant from being convicted by unreliable evidence. 97 To the
extent a high degree of reliability can be independently estab-
lished, the utility of cross-examination is diminished. The more-
reliable the hearsay, the less likely it is to be qualified or repu-
diated by the declarant, no matter how skillful the cross-
examination.98
95. R. KEETON, TRiAL TACTIcs AND METHODS 98 (2d ed. 1973).
96. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
97. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
98. When reliability is used as a criterion for determining whether hear-
say should be exempt from the unavailability requirement, courts will presum-
ably require a higher standard of reliability than would apply in determining
the admissibility of hearsay once unavailability is shown. An evaluation of the
reliability of the hearsay statement is the second prong of the test announced
in Roberts and is to take place once the unavailability of the declarant has
been demonstrated. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). If the same
standard of reliability were used in determining an exemption from the consti-
tutional unavailability requirement as in determining the admissibility of hear-
say from an unavailable declarant, the two prongs of Roberts would collapse
into one test.
Two standards of reliability appear justified as a matter of policy because
of the different interests involved. Once unavailability of the hearsay declar-
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C. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO TESTING BY CROSS-EXAMINATION
Even though Professor John Wigmore described cross-ex-
amination as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth,"99 it is simply not the case that all hearsay is
equally susceptible to testing by cross-examination. In some
cases, for example, whatever a hearsay declarant might say on
cross-examination would be unlikely to have persuasive impact
on the jury, given the motives of the declarant and the poten-
tial repercussions of candid testimony. Furthermore, in docu-
mentary records cases it is often foreseeable that the declarant
will lack any current recollection of the recorded statement
that would provide a reasonable basis for cross-examination.
When an automobile assembly line worker enters a vehicle
identification number onto an inventory list, or a sales clerk in
a busy department store prepares a sales receipt, it is highly un-
likely that such a declarant, if called to testify at trial a year or
more later, would have sufficient memory of the matter re-
corded to make their recorded statement susceptible to testing
by cross-examination.
Similarly, a court reporter's transcript, under normal cir-
cumstances, cannot be effectively tested by cross-examination
of the court reporter. The transcript is hearsay because it is an
out-of-court assertion by the court reporter regarding the testi-
mony given at a prior hearing. If examined regarding it, how-
ever, the reporter is likely to respond simply that the transcript
represents the reporter's best recollection of the testimony
given. Presumably for this reason, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved the admission of transcripts of former testimony with-
out requiring a showing of unavailability of the court
reporter. 00
ant has been shown, the choice is between admitting the hearsay statement or
losing its probative value entirely. When reliability is used as a factor in deter-
mining whether an exemption from the constitutional unavailability require-
ment should be recognized, however, the issue presented is whether to require
the prosecutor to undertake the effort necessary to produce an available hear-
say declarant in court. Courts are likely to apply a stricter standard of reliabil-
ity in the latter circumstance.
99. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (rev. ed. 1974).
100. In most of the former testimony cases, the testimony was proven by
the court reporter's notes or transcript. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
60 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895); see also Anderson
v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 n.11 (1974) (no confrontation violation in ad-
mitting transcript of election contest hearing).
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D. ADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVES TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
An assessment of the utility of confrontation requires an
examination of the alternatives. Cross-examination is not the
only method by which a criminal defendant may challenge the
accuracy of a hearsay statement or the credibility of a hearsay
declarant. Contradictory evidence may be introduced, which, in
some cases, may provide an even more effective basis for chal-
lenge than cross-examination. For example, an error in a mar-
ket report might be more convincingly demonstrated by
showing a contrary figure in competing reports than by cross-
examining the preparer or preparers of the report. Similarly, a
statement in a learned treatise may be more effectively chal-
lenged by evidence from other treatises, or through the testi-
mony of expert witnesses, rather than by cross-examining the
author of the treatise.
Under modern evidence codes, a hearsay declarant can be
impeached by extrinsic evidence as well as by cross-examina-
tion. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declar-
ant had testified as a witness.
10 1
The availability of this procedure should be considered when
courts evaluate the adequacy of alternatives to cross-
examination.L0 2
Finally, in unusual circumstances, cross-examination of a
person other than the declarant may provide an adequate basis
for testing a hearsay statement. For example, a defendant may
seek to attack the accuracy of a documentary record by chal-
lenging the reliability of the recording process. The actual de-
clarant may be a low-level employee who made a routine entry
and who has little knowledge regarding the overall recording
procedures or the most significant factors that could affect the
accuracy of the final record. If a witness familiar with the re-
cording procedures is produced, such as a supervisor or agency
head, cross-examination of that witness may provide an ade-
quate substitute for cross-examination of the declarant.
101. FED. R. EVID. 806.
102. But see Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895) (approving re-
fusal to allow impeachment of hearsay declarant by showing subsequent incon-
sistent statements).
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E. Dutton v. Evans
The four criteria for assessing the utility of confrontation
suggested above are consistent with Dutton v. Evans,0 3 the
only case cited in Roberts as presenting a situation in which the
utility of trial confrontation was sufficiently remote to justify
an exemption from the constitutional unavailability require-
ment.104 In Dutton, the defendant, Evans, was convicted of first
degree murder of three Georgia patrolmen. 0 5 He allegedly ac-
ted with two accomplices: Williams, who was tried separately
prior to Evans, and Truett, who was granted immunity in ex-
change for his testimony against Williams and Evans. 06 At Ev-
ans's trial, the primary witness was Truett, who related in great
detail Evans's involvement in the murders. 0 7 An additional
witness was Shaw, a fellow prisoner of Williams. 08 Shaw testi-
fied, over a confrontation objection, that when Williams was re-
turned to his cell after his arraignment on the murder charges,
Shaw asked him: "How did you make out in court?"'0 9 Wil-
liams allegedly responded: "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-
of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."" 0 The trial
court admitted this statement under the Georgia coconspirator
exception."'
Following the Georgia Supreme Court's affirmance of the
conviction,1 2 Evans initiated a habeas corpus proceeding in fed-
eral court. The district court denied the writ,1 13 but the court
of appeals reversed, finding a confrontation clause violation." 4
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that admission of the
statement did not violate Evans's right of confrontation."5-
There was, however, no majority opinion.
The plurality opinion" 6 expressly adopted the first two
103. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
104. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980).
105. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 76.
106. Id.
107. Id at 77.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 78.
112. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 407, 150 S.E.2d 240, 251, cert denied, 385
U.S. 953 (1966).
113. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 827 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd 400 U.S. 74
(1970).
114. Id
115. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970).
116. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Stewart and joined by
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suggested criteria, centrality and reliability, as a basis for its
conclusion that introduction of the hearsay statement did not
offend the confrontation clause.1 17 With regard to the central-
ity criterion, the plurality found the hearsay to be neither "cru-
cial" nor "devastating,"1 1 8 and to be "of peripheral significance
at most."'1 9 The opinion noted that there were nineteen other
witnesses besides Shaw who were called by the prosecution,
and that the primary evidence of Evans's involvement in the
murder was Truett's testimony. 20 Williams's hearsay state-
ment, as related by Shaw, was likely to be viewed by the jury as
merely cumulative, or at most, corroborative.
With regard to the reliability criterion, the plurality found
four "indicia of reliability" that justified dispensing with con-
frontation under the facts of the case. First, Williams's state-
ment was not an "express assertion about past fact," and thus
"carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the
statement undue weight."' 12 Second, it was clear from other
evidence that Williams was in a position to know whether or
not Evans was involved in the murder.122 Third, there was lit-
tle chance that Williams's statement was based on faulty recol-
lection. 123  Fourth, Williams made the statement under
circumstances which indicate "that Williams did not misrepre-
sent Evans' involvement in the crime. These circumstances go
beyond a showing that Williams had no apparent reason to lie
to Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it was against his
penal interest to make it."'24
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and White. Justice Harlan filed a
separate concurring opinion. Id at 93.
117. Id at 87-89. The authors of a leading treatise view the opinion as also
being based on a third factor: whether the prosecutor has been guilty of mis-
conduct or negligence in failing to produce the declarant or in the manner in
which the jury was made aware of the hearsay statement. 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 15, % 800[04], at 800-26. Although the plurality did
briefly discuss this factor, 400 U.S. at 87, it was not applicable to the facts of
Dutton, and it can be questioned whether the confrontation clause is the ap-
propriate vehicle for analyzing questions of prosecutorial misconduct.
118. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87. It is clear that a hearsay statement may be
found not "crucial" or "devastating" even though it is of sufficient importance
that its admission cannot be categorized as harmless error. Only two of the
four justices in the Dutton plurality were willing to decide the case on harm-
less error grounds. See id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring).
119. Id at 87.
120. Id
121. Id at 88.
122. Id
123. Id at 89.
124. Id
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The Dutton plurality opinion also gave implicit recognition
to the last two suggested criteria for evaluating the admissibil-
ity of hearsay statements. The plurality indicated its awareness
that not all hearsay statements are susceptible to testing by
cross-examination when it noted that "the possibility that cross-
examination of Williams could conceivably have shown the jury
that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable
was wholly unreal. ' 125 Given the circumstances, the probative
value of Williams's statement depended more on the credibility
of Shaw's testimony that the statement was made than on any-
thing Williams might have said on cross-examination. 2 6 Shaw,
as the plurality was careful to note,12 7 had been fully cross-ex-
amined at trial.
The plurality opinion also stated that "the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for eval-
uating the truth of the prior statement.' "128 This pronounce-
ment supports consideration of the adequacy of alternatives to
cross-examination in determining whether the right to confron-
tation has been satisfied. If there are practical alternatives to
cross-examination which enable the defendant to challenge the
125. Id. at 89. The unspoken premise underlying this assertion was that if
Williams had been called as a witness and were willing to testify, it was en-
tirely predictable that he might deny, qualify, or retract his statement. The
plurality apparently took the view that the jury would be likely to find such
testimony unpersuasive. Williams's statement inculpated himself as well as
Evans, and because his conviction was on appeal, there was a possibility of a
retrial.
The four dissenting justices expressed pointed disagreement with this
view:
Thus we have a case with all the unanswered questions that the
confrontation of witnesses through cross-examination is meant to aid
in answering: What did the declarant say, and what did he mean, and
was it the truth? If Williams had testified and been cross-examined,
Evans' counsel could have fully explored these and other matters.
Id. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. The Fifth Circuit described Shaw's testimony as "somewhat incredi-
ble." Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 828 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 U.S. 74
(1970). Justice Blackmun stated:
I am at a loss to understand how any normal jury, as we must assume
this one to have been, could be led to believe, let alone be influenced
by, this astonishing account by Shaw of his conversation with Wil-
liams in a normal voice through a closed hospital room door.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 (1970) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
127. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87, 89.
128. Id at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
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truth of the hearsay statement, courts should include that fac-
tor in their determination of admissibility.
It is suggested that all four of these criteria-centrality, re-
liability, susceptibility to testing by cross-examination, and ade-
quacy of alternatives to cross-examination-should be
considered by courts when they attempt to determine whether
production of an available hearsay declarant is required by the
confrontation clause. 2 9 Whether any one of these factors
should be found controlling will, of course, depend on the na-
ture of the case.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNAVAILABILITY
REQUIREMENT AND THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE
A remaining difficulty after Roberts is reconciling the
Court's statement that a showing of unavailability will nor-
mally be required with the footnote allowing exemptions when
the "utility of trial confrontation" is remote. The difficulty can
129. Apart from granting exemptions from the unavailability requirement
based on application of these criteria, there is one other approach the Court
could take that would avoid needless production of hearsay declarants, at least
in those cases where they are unlikely to have sufficient recollection of the
prior statement to justify cross-examination. The Court could recognize likely
absence of memory as a ground of constitutional unavailability. In England,
one ground of unavailability allowing a documentary record to be received in a
criminal case is when the declarant "cannot reasonably be expected (having
regard to the time which has elapsed since he supplied the information and to
all the circumstances) to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the
information he supplied." Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1965, ch. 20,
§ 1(b).
Under the definition of unavailability in Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), the wit-
ness must be produced to testify "to a lack of memory of the subject matter of
his statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3). The Advisory Committee note to
Rule 804 also states: "lit will be noted that the lack of memory must be estab-
lished by the testimony of the witness himself, which clearly contemplates his
production and subjection to cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory
committee note.
The Rule 803 exceptions, however, are not governed by the Rule 804(a)
definition of unavailability, but only by the constitutional unavailability re-
quirement to the extent it is applicable. There is no compelling reason why
absence of recollection must be established, as a matter of constitutional law,
by the testimony of the hearsay declarant. The Court has not yet squarely ad-
dressed the issues of memory loss as a ground of constitutional unavailability
or how such memory loss must be established. See California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970) ("Whether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so af-
fected Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the
application of the Confrontation Clause in this case is an issue which is not
ripe for decision at this juncture.").
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be illustrated by an analysis of the twenty-four hearsay excep-
tions set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 803.130 Only fifteen
are used with any degree of frequency in criminal prosecu-
tions.'3 ' With respect to six of these exceptions, the Court may
indeed have intended to impose a constitutional unavailability
requirement in criminal trials that would be applicable in most
circumstances. 132
130. Fed. R. Evid. 803 includes the following subsections:
(1) Present sense impression.
(2) Excited utterance.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph (6).
(8) Public records and reports.
(9) Records of vital statistics.
(10) Absence of public record or entry.
(11) Records of religious organizations.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates.
(13) Family records.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property.
(16) Statements in ancient documents.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications.
(18) Learned treatise.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history.
(21) Reputation as to character.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or
boundaries.
(24) Other exceptions.
FED. R. EVID. 803.
131. These exceptions: present sense impressions; excited utterances; state-
ments of mental, emotional, or physical condition; statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment; recorded recollection; records of regularly con-
ducted activity; absence of entry in records of regularly conducted activity;
public records and reports; records of vital statistics; absence of public record
or entry; market reports; learned treatises; reputation as to character; judg-
ments of previous convictions; and the residual exception. This is not to say
that the remaining Fed. R. Evid. 803 exceptions are never used by prosecutors.
See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 357 (2d Cir. 1978) (in tax evasion
prosecution, documents creating interest in real property held to be admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 803(14)).
132. It may be that the Court intended to impose a general unavailability
requirement upon statements offered in criminal trials under the first four ex-
ceptions to the rule against hearsay. See supra note 130. It has been con-
tended that these four exceptions have lesser reliability than some of the
other exceptions. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Crticism, of
Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1,
25-38. In fact, during the drafting process, it was urged that they be included
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With respect to the remaining nine exceptions, however, a
requirement that the declarant be produced or be shown to be
unavailable is inappropriate in most circumstances. Given the
nature of the hearsay offered under these exceptions, the util-
ity of trial confrontation is likely to be remote. Therefore, a
showing of unavailability should not be rigidly imposed. These
nine exceptions generally satisfy the criteria discussed in the
preceding section, although there are some significant areas of
potential conflict with the confrontation clause.
A. REPUTATION AS TO CHARACTER
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(21) establishes a hearsay ex-
ception for "[r]eputation of a person's character among his asso-
ciates or in the community.1 33 Reputation evidence is hearsay
when offered to prove the truth of the alleged reputation be-
cause the character witness is testifying to a distilled version of
what other members of the community have said about the in-
dividual in question.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a prosecutor may use
reputation evidence to rebut evidence of good character offered
by a defendant,13 4 to rebut evidence offered by the defendant
regarding a pertinent character trait of a crime victim, 3 5 to re-
as part of Fed. R. Evid. 804, which requires its own showing of unavailability.
See id.
The Court may also have intended that the residual exception set forth in
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) be generally subject to an unavailability requirement in
criminal trials. To do so, however, would largely eliminate the distinction be-
tween Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), which is virtually
identical except that it contains its own unavailability requirement.
Whether the Court intended to require production of the declarant or a
showing of unavailability in order to admit recorded recollection may be unim-
portant, because as a practical matter the testimony of the declarant is already
required in order to establish the necessary foundation. The exception re-
quires a showing that the witness has "insufficient recollection to enable him
to testify fully and accurately" but that he "made or adopted" an accurate rec-
ord of the matter at a time when "the matter was fresh in his memory." FED.
R. EVID. 803(5). If the court finds that the witness has such a loss of memory
that the witness cannot be effectively cross-examined regarding the earlier
statement, then a showing of unavailability will have been made. On the other
hand, if the court finds the witness has sufficient recollection to be subject to
"full and effective" cross-examination, then the requirements of the confron-
tation clause will be satisfied. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970);
United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445
U.S. 943 (1980).
133. FED. R. Evrm. 803(21).
134. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1).
135. FED. R. Evin. 404(a)(2).
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but evidence that the victim in a homicide case was the first ag-
gressor,1 36 to impeach a witness by showing that witness has an
untruthful character,137 or to rehabilitate a witness, previously
impeached by evidence of untruthful character, by showing a
reputation for truthful character.1 38
Production of all the declarants who contributed to the
witness's assessment of reputation would obviously be impracti-
cable, even if they could all be identified. Moreover, such evi-
dence has low susceptibility to testing by cross-examination.
Cross-examination of the character witness regarding the basis
for the witness's assessment of reputation, or production of op-
posing character witnesses, is likely to be far more effective
than cross-examination of any of the multiple declarants whose
statements compose the reputation. Application of an unavaila-
bility requirement to reputation evidence would effectively bar
its use by prosecutors, thereby undermining the careful balance
struck by the Federal Rule of Evidence that governs the admis-
sibility of character evidence in criminal cases. 13 9
B. JUDGMENT OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22) creates an exception for a
judgment of conviction for any crime "punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year," when offered "to prove
any fact essential to sustain the judgment."' 40 This exception is
used when a prosecutor seeks not merely to prove the existence
of a prior conviction, such as in a prosecution for being an ex-
convict in possession of a firearm, but to prove the person con-
victed actually committed the underlying criminal act. A
common utilization of this exception in criminal trials arises
when a witness is impeached with a prior criminal conviction
under Rule 609.141 For the conviction to have probative value
136. Id.
137. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), 608(a).
138. 1&
139. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608(a).
140. FED. R. EVID. 803(22). That rule provides:
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person
guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the government in a criminal prosecution
for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but
does not affect admissibility.
141. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
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as impeachment evidence, it must be offered to prove that the
witness actually committed the crime, and therefore the wit-
ness's testimony should be viewed as less trustworthy.
When offered to prove a fact "essential to sustain the judg-
ment," a judgment of conviction represents the hearsay conclu-
sion of the previous trier of fact in the proceeding where the
judgment was rendered. The confrontation clause should not
be interpreted to require the production of the previous judge
or jury to be cross-examined regarding the correctness of the
conclusion of guilt.
The most serious potential conflict between this exception
and the right of confrontation was perceived and obviated by
the drafters of the Federal Rules, who added the qualifying
phrase "but not including, when offered by the government in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment,
judgments against persons other than the accused."1 42 This
provision brings the rule into accord with Kirby v. United
States,143 in which the Court held it was error to convict the de-
fendant of possessing stolen postage stamps when the only evi-
dence introduced to prove they were stolen was the record of
another trial in which a third person had been convicted of the
theft.'"
C. RECORDS OF VITAL STATISTICS
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(9) provides for the admissi-
bility of "records or data compilations, in any form, of births,
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was
made to a public office pursuant to the requirements of law.' 145
Records qualifying under this exception tend to have high relia-
bility and low susceptibility to testing by cross-examination. 146
note 20, § 470, at 906-07 & n.31 (noting the omission of misdemeanor convic-
tions permissible for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 609 as an "oversight").
142. FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
143. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
144. I& at 54.
145. FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
146. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 457, at 777-78.
Records of vital statistics may be considered trustworthy for four rea-
sons: First, the information is generally gathered by professional peo-
ple in the discharge of public and professional duty and recorded and
preserved by public employees in the ordinary course of their employ-
ment. Second, much of the information thus gathered and preserved
relates to contemporary events and often reflects simple facts as to
which there is little room for dispute, so risks of faulty memory and
misperception are minimized. Third, births, marriages, and deaths
mark occasions important in the lives of persons likely to supply the
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In many cases, preparers will have little or no memory of a spe-
cific birth, death, or marriage. The documentary records they
made will often be more accurate evidence of the event than
any testimony they could provide. For these reasons, such
records should generally be exempt from the unavailability
requirement. 147
On the other hand, if such records are offered for a pur-
pose other than to prove the birth, death, or marriage, there
may be greater justification for allowing testing of the state-
ment by cross-examination. For example, a conclusion as to the
cause of death in a death certificate or a statement of paternity
in a birth certificate will have less reliability and would present
a greater danger of violating the right of confrontation.
D. PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) creates a hearsay excep-
tion for "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies. ' 148 A wide variety of
such official records and reports have been admitted in criminal
prosecutions without a showing of declarant unavailability,
both before and after Roberts.149 An exemption from the un-
information to the person reporting to the public agency, and ordina-
rily it may be expected that all persons involved will make an effort
to be truthful and accurate. Fourth, often (although not by any
means always) vital statistics are prepared before any thought is given
to litigation, and the distortions which the prospect of litigation cause
are thus absent.
IM
147. In highly unusual circumstances, such as when evidence of the death
of an alleged murder victim is uncertain, proof of death by a death certificate
may be constitutionally impermissible. See Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d
342, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1984) (admission of death certificate without opportunity
to cross-examine maker violated confrontation clause where identity of corpse
was disputed, and certificate was based on information received from third
person).
148. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). The exception applies to:
Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office
or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law en-
forcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, un-
less the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
Id-
149. See, e.g., United States v. King, 590 F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1978) (vehi-
cle title documents), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973 (1979); United States v. Down-
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availability requirement is justified in most cases, particularly
for records and reports of the type described in category (A),
which set forth "the activities of the office or agency."1 5 0
Rule 803(8)'s greatest potential conflict with the confronta-
tion clause arises with respect to records or reports of the types
described in categories (B) and (C).151L The rule, however, pro-
hibits prosecutors from introducing category (C) reports,152 and
category (B) reports cannot be offered when they involve "mat-
ters observed by police officers and other law enforcement per-
sonnel."'153  These restrictions greatly limit potential
confrontation clause problems. Some reports that are arguably
admissible under category (B) may raise confrontation concerns
if offered in a criminal proceeding to prove unlawful conduct
by the defendant, even though the preparer was not a law en-
forcement officer.'m
Rule 803(8) presents several problems of interpretation.
The boundary between categories (A) and (B) is imprecise, 55
ing, 454 F.2d 373, 376 (10th Cir. 1972) (letter from commanding officer of
induction center stating that defendant failed to report); United States v.
Ketchum, 445 F.2d 860, 860 (10th Cir. 1971) (photocopy of title certificate);
United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 271-72 (9th Cir.) (alien registration docu-
ments), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); People v. Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137, 143-
44, 590 P.2d 952, 956-57 (1979) (fingerprint cards, prison photograph, and copy
of burglary conviction); People v. Smith, 113 Ill. App. 3d 101, 103-04, 446 N.E.2d
575, 576-77 (1983) (Secretary of State's abstract of driver's license revocation);
Barnett v. State, 429 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 1981) (conviction records); State v.
Karney, 208 Kan. 677, 680-81, 494 P.2d 1204, 1209 (1972) (automobile registra-
tion certificate); State v. Conway, 70 Or. App. 721, 724, 690 P.2d 1128, 1129
(1984) (state police intoxilyzer certification), rev, denied, 298 Or. 704, 695 P.2d
1371 (1985).
150. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(A). As one commentary noted:
[C]lause (A) [embraces] records of a simple factual nature which focus
exclusively or at least primarily upon the functions of a public agency.
A pristine example is the records of the Treasury, offered to prove re-
ceipts and disbursements of that Department. Another is the official
transcript of a judicial proceeding, offered to prove that an officer of
the court administered an oath to a witness. Yet another is the return
of a marshal or similar officer, used to prove that he served papers
upon a particular person at a particular place and time.
4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 455, at 724-25 (footnotes
omitted).
151. For the text of Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B) and (C), see supra note 148.
152. See FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C).
153. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(B).
154. One example would be the report of a social worker for a public
agency offered against a defendant in a child abuse prosecution to prove prior
acts of abuse by the defendant.
155. Occasionally courts classify records under category (B) that more ap-
propriately fit within category (A), thereby necessitating an analysis of the law
enforcement report limitation. See, e.g., United States v. Union Nacional de
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and the meaning of "law enforcement personnel" in category
(B) is uncertain.15 6 Furthermore, some courts have taken the
position that the law enforcement report restriction is not abso-
lute and have carved out an exception permitting law enforce-
ment reports of a ministerial nature.1 57
Regardless of how these evidentiary issues are resolved,
the confrontation clause implications should be analyzed using
the four criteria identified previously. Public records and re-
ports generally have exceedingly high reliability.'5 8 Of particu-
lar importance to confrontation analysis is the susceptibility of
the record or report to testing by cross-examination. The more
routine the record or report, the less the justification for re-
quiring confrontation of its preparer. 59 However, highly evalu-
Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (1st Cir. 1978) (return of service by U.S. Mar-
shall); State v. Smith, 66 Or. App. 703, 675 P.2d 510, 512 (1984) (document cer-
tifying that breathalyzer equipment was in -proper operating order).
156. Compare United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978) (IRS
employees who record information routinely used in criminal prosecutions are
"law enforcement personnel") and United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d
Cir. 1977) (full-time chemists of United States Customs Service are "law en-
forcement personnel") with United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th
Cir.) (city building inspector not "law enforcement personnel") cert denied,
439 U.S. 868 (1978).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1979)
(license plate records of border crossings made by customs inspector), cert de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1978); State v. Smith, 66 Or. App. 703, 675 P.2d 510, 512
(1984) (document certifying that breathalyzer equipment was in proper order).
158. As one commentary noted:
Statements made in such records and reports are considered trustwor-
thy because of the great public duty which attends the discharge of
official functions. In effect it is presumed that public servants per-
form their official tasks carefully and without bias or corruption, and
it is sometimes thought that the scrutiny and exposure surrounding
governmental functions add further assurance that statements in pub-
lic records are trustworthy. No doubt the repetitive routine underly-
ing the preparation of many public documents adds a measure of
protection against misstatement.
4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 454, at 719-20.
One of the few factors adversely affecting reliability is that Fed. R. Evid.
803(8) does not require that the record have been made near the time of the
event recorded. One commentator has suggested that "[i]t is appropriate to
impose a contemporaneity requirement on the admissiblity of public records in
criminal cases in order to enhance the reliability of such evidence." Alexan-
der, The Hearsay Exception for Public Records in Federal Criminal Trials, 47
ALB. L. REv. 699, 716 n.86 (1983); see State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 119, 542
P.2d 782, 787 (1975).
159. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 671 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Tenn.) (admitting U.S.
Navy dental records to identify body-"Even if Dr. Moats had testified, he
could have said little other than what was on the records themselves."), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 231 (1984).
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ative reports, particularly when prepared in connection with
the prosecution of a particular criminal case, may violate the
right of confrontation in cases where the preparer is not
produced.160
E. RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY
Records of regularly conducted activity, commonly re-
ferred to as "business records," are frequently received in crim-
inal prosecutions without production of the declarant or a
showing of unavailability.161 Examples of business records that
have been admitted include motel registration forms,162 war-
ranty repair orders,' 63 telephone records,16 4 banking records, 65
hospital records, 66  dental records,167  and employment
160. See, e.g., Stewart v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 82 (6th Cir. 1976) (FBI ballis-
tics report violated defendant's confrontation right); Kienlen v. United States,
437 F.2d 843, 849 (10th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric opinion in state hospital records
violated defendant's right of confrontation); Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d
706, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1954) (error to admit IRS worksheets prepared specifically
for prosecution of defendant); Porter v. State, 578 S.W.2d 742, 746-47 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (letters, reports, and documents, containing hearsay from a
federal parole officer's file pertaining to defendant's supervision violated con-
frontation clause), affd, 623 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 965
(1982).
161. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) provides for the admissibility of:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occu-
pation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
If the business records constitute admissions of the defendant under Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) or (B), or if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination at trial, see, e.g., United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 882 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1602 (1984), confrontation requirements will
be satisfied without a showing of unavailability.
162. United States v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1977).
163. State v. Matousek, 287 Minn. 344, 348-51, 178 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (1970).
164. United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1971).
165. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978).
166. Butts v. Wainwright, 575 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1978).
167. State v. Caldwell, 671 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Tenn.), certdenied, 105 S. Ct.
231 (1984).
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records. 168
Records of regularly conducted activity are likely to satisfy
the reliability criterion.169 The foundation requirements' 70 for
the rule are designed to insure accuracy. It must be the "regu-
lar practice" of the business activity to make such records, they
must be made "at or near the time" of the event, the informa-
tion must come from a person "with knowledge," and they
must be "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity."'171 The custodian "or other qualified witness" must be
produced to provide the necessary foundation and to be cross-
examined regarding the method of preparation.172 Moreover,
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides that records are to be
excluded if "the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."'173
Records of regularly conducted activity also tend to lack
susceptibility to testing by cross-examination because the de-
clarant's recollection of the matter recorded will frequently be
less trustworthy than the record itself. Occasionally, cross-ex-
amination of the witness who establishes the foundation for the
records, or another witness familiar with the recording process,
will provide the trier of fact with "a satisfactory basis for evalu-
168. State v. Partee, 32 Or. App. 117, 121-22, 573 P.2d 751, 753 (1978).
169. As one commentator noted:
Records of regularly conducted activities cannot fulfill the function of
aiding the proper transaction of business unless accurate. The motive
for following a routine of accuracy is great and the motive to falsify
largely non-existent. More specifically, the reliability of business
records is supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and con-
tinuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of
business in relying upon them, and/or by a duty to make an accurate
record as part of a continuing job or occupation.
M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.6, at 813 (1982).
170. See supra note 161.
171. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
172. Id.
173. Id. A frequent issue with respect to business records is that they may
encompass multiple levels of hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) is authority only
for admitting statements in business records made by a declarant having a
business duty to report. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20,
§ 448, at 681; cf Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 128, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (1930)
(police officer's memorandum inadmissible because contains statement of by-
stander having no duty to report). Hearsay statements made by persons not
having a business duty to report will have to satisfy an independent hearsay
exception. Fed. R. Evid. 805 provides: "Hearsay included within hearsay is not
excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statement con-
forms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." FED. R.
EVID. 805. In addition, such statements must be subjected to a separate con-
frontation analysis.
[Vol. 70:665
UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
ating the truth of the prior statement"174 that is a constitution-
ally adequate substitute for cross-examination of the
declarant.175
It is clear, however, that not all records qualifying for ad-
mission under Rule 803(6) satisfy the confrontation clause. A
business record charging illegal activity by the defendant, such
as the report of a store detective that he observed defendant
shoplift, if offered without producing the declarant, would
come dangerously close to "trial by affidavit," which the clause
was intended to prevent1 76 Both before and after Roberts,
courts have excluded various types of records of regularly con-
ducted activity as violating the defendant's right of
confrontation.177
One factor bearing on whether a defendant should have
the right to confront the preparer of a record of regularly con-
ducted activity is whether it was prepared for law enforcement
purposes.178 The reasons for preparation may affect the rec-
ord's reliability. As noted previously, Rule 803(8)(B) excludes
reports in criminal cases of "matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel."'179 A majority of courts
considering the question have also read this limitation into
Rule 803(6), in part to avoid potential conflict with the confron-
tation clause.'8 0 One commentator would go further and ex-
174. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); supra text accompanying note
128.
175. See supra text following note 102.
176. "The primary objective of the [confrontation clause] was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits... being used against the prisoner in lieu of
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness...." Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802 (9th Cir. 1983)
(business ledger where no showing made of preparer's identity or unavailabil-
ity); Stewart v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 82 (6th Cir. 1976) (FBI ballistics report);
Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 344-48 (6th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric opinion in
medical records), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Gregory v. State, 40 Md.
App. 297, 325, 391 A.2d 437, 454 (1978) (same); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d
117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (laboratory report).
178. The fact that a business record was prepared for purposes of litigation
may be considered by courts on the question of whether it should be excluded
because the "circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."
FED. R. EVID. 803(6); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1943); United
States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1957).
179. See supra text accompanying note 153.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[Ihe plain language of Rule 803(8) makes it abundantly clear that it is the
rule which covers reports made by law enforcement personnel."); United
States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e conclude that state-
ments inadmissible as public agency reports under Rule 803(8) may not be re-
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clude business records prepared by a private organization such
as a hospital if they were requested for law enforcement pur-
poses or were otherwise "accusatory."'' 8 1
The types of records of regularly recorded activity that
raise the greatest confrontation concerns are evaluative
records. Even though Rule 803(6) expressly allows "opinions"
to be included, at least where they are trustworthy, records
consisting largely of opinions or conclusions often have the
least reliability and the greatest susceptibility to testing by
cross-examination. 8 2 Thus, in several cases courts have held
that the receipt of medical records containing a psychiatric
opinion regarding the defendant's mental condition violated the
defendant's right of confrontation. 8 3 In a similar vein, in
United States v. McCintock,8 4 the Ninth Circuit held that ap-
praisals of gemstones admitted under the business records ex-
ception violated the confrontation clause. The court
commented that "because of the various means of evaluation
and apparent subjective decisions that enter into the evaluation
of gems, McClintock's confrontation of the preparers of the re-
ports may have been valuable to his defense.' u8 5
The issue most troubling to courts appears to be the admis-
sibility of laboratory reports or reports of scientific tests or pro-
ceived merely because they satisfy Rule 803(6) and that section (6) does not
open a back door for evidence excluded by section (8)."); United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78-80, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[I]n criminal cases reports of
public agencies setting forth matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel... cannot satisfy the standards of any hearsay excep-
tion if those reports are sought to be introduced against the accused."). See
generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 168 (1982) (discussing admissibility over hear-
say objection of police observations and investigative findings, offered by the
government in criminal prosecutions, that are excluded from the public
records exception to the hearsay rule).
181. M. GRAHAM, supra note 169, § 803.6, at 824-26 n.33.
182. Courts approving records of regularly conducted activity against a con-
frontation challenge have sometimes cited their nonevaluative nature as justi-
fication for doing so. See, e.g., People v. Kirtdoll, 391 Mich. 370, 385-89, 217
N.W.2d 37, 46-47 (1974) (rape victim's hospital record admitted in part because
it did not involve subjective judgments such as diagnosis); Hagenkord v. State,
100 Wis. 2d 452, 478, 302 N.W.2d 421, 434 (1981) ("We hold only that hospital
records bear such an unusual indicia of reliability and trustworthiness that, in
circumstances where the evidence is clinical and nondiagnostic ... such
records satisfy the confrontation clause").
183. See Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 347-49 (6th Cir. 1971), cert denied,
409 U.S. 884 (1972); Kienlen v. United States, 437 F.2d 843, 848-49 (10th Cir.
1971); Gregory v. State, 40 Md. App. 297, 325-26, 391 A.2d 437, 454 (1978).
184. 748 F.2d 1278, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. Id. at 1292.
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cedures.18 6 A common-sense determination of the admissibility
of such reports will generally be obtained by application of the
four criteria discussed previously. The higher the reliability of
the testing procedure, the lower the necessity for confronta-
tion.8 7 The greater the objectivity of the test, the less its sus-
ceptibility to testing by cross-examination.188 As a practical
matter, a favorable ruling on admissibility is likely to be facili-
tated by showing the qualifications of any declarant who is
claimed to be an expert and by showing that the report was
made available to the defendant in advance of trial. 8 9
186. Cases admitting such reports include: Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458
F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (laboratory report finding presence of semen);
Montgomery v. Fogg, 479 F. Supp. 363, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (autopsy report);
State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 570-84, 436 A.2d 33, 38-44 (1980) (laboratory
report identifying marijuana); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-40
(D.C. App. 1984) (DEA chemical analysis); Clark v. State, - Ind. -, 436
N.E.2d 779, 781-82 (1982) (laboratory report regarding blood type on knife);
State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 396-97, 297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (chemical an-
alyst's determination of blood alcohol level); State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 323
S.E.2d 316, 328 (1984) (same); State v. Robbins, 512 S.W.2d 265, 267-68 (Tenn.
1974) (same); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 115-21, 542 P.2d 782, 784-88
(1975) (chemical blood analysis).
Cases excluding such reports include:. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,
78-80 (2d Cir. 1977) (chemist's report); Stewart v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 82-85
(6th Cir. 1976) (FBI ballistics report); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310,
315, 322 A.2d 653, 655-57 (1974) (autopsy report); State v. Henderson, 554
S.W.2d 117, 121-22 (Tenn. 1977) (laboratory analysis that substance is LSD).
See generally Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1979).
187. Courts should be particularly receptive to reports merely regarding
maintenance of the testing equipment. See People v. Black, 84 Ill. App. 3d
1050, 1053, 406 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1980) (test decal on breathalyzer); State v. Smith,
66 Or. App. 703, 675 P.2d 510, 512 (1984) (certificate of breathalyzer
inspection).
188. In State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 323 S.E.2d 316, 323 (1984) the court
noted: "In short, the scientific and technological advancements which have
made possible this type of analysis have removed the necessity for a subjective
determination of impairment, so appropriate for cross examination, and have
increasingly removed the operator as a material element in the objective de
termination of blood alcohol concentration." Id
189. A different approach to determining the admissibility of records of
regularly conducted activity is suggested in Pickett v. State, 456 So. 2d 330
(Ala. Crim. App. 1982), where the court listed five factors to be used "in deter-
mining whether documentary evidence introduced without the opportunity for
cross examination of its maker satisfies the requirements of the confrontation
clause." Id. at 335. They are:
(1) whether the evidence has high probability of reliability, (2)
whether the evidence is "essentially documentary" or essentially testi-
monial, (3) whether the evidence is collateral, is used by the State
only in rebuttal, or is probative of a material element of the offense,
and if the last, whether the evidence is cumulative to that given by
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F. ABSENCE OF ENTRY IN RECORDS OF REGULARLY
CONDUCTED ACTIVITY
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(7) also creates a hearsay ex-
ception which allows the absence of an entry in a business rec-
ord to be used as proof that an event did not happen. 190 This is
the converse of the situation covered by Rule 803(6). An exam-
ple of reliance upon this exception in a criminal prosecution
would be to prove theft of a rental car by offering records of
the car agency showing the absence of any entry indicating re-
turn of the vehicle.' 91 Because hearsay offered under this ex-
ception is only indirect evidence of the matter sought to be
proved, it carries "on its face a warning to the jury against giv-
ing the statement undue weight."'192
The declarant is the person or persons who made the
records and failed to record a certain matter. If the nonrecord-
ing was intended to be an assertion regarding the nonexistence
or nonoccurrence of the matter, it is hearsay and reliance on
this exception is necessary.193 In many cases, no assertion will
have been intended by the declarant, and the evidence will not
be hearsay as defined in Rule 801.194
live witnesses, (4) whether the evidence connects the defendant di-
rectly to the offense charged, and (5) whether the defendant has an
alternative to, or a prior opportunity for, cross examination.
Id (citations omitted). The court commented that "[t]hese factors must be bal-
anced against a defendant's rights secured by the confrontation clause." Id. at
335-36.
190. Fed. R. Evid. 803(7) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay
for:
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with
[Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)], to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack
of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(7).
191. See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 892-94 (9th Cir. 1969)
(decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules).
192. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); see supra text accompanying
note 121.
193. Under Fed. R. Evid. 801(a), conduct, presumably including failure to
record, is hearsay only "if ... intended ... as an assertion." FED. R. EviM.
801(a).
194. The Advisory Committee's note to Fed. R. Evid. 803(7) states: "While
probably not hearsay as defined in Rule 801, supra, decisions may be found
which class the evidence not only as hearsay but also as not within any excep-
tion. In order to set the question at rest in favor of admissibility, it is specifi-
cally treated here." FED. R. EVID. 803(7) advisory committee note.
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If no assertion was intended, there is little need to test the
sincerity of the declarant by cross-examination. Even if an as-
sertion was intended by the nonrecording of a certain matter, it
is likely to have the same reliability as a recording of a matter
under Rule 803(6). Thus, a similar standard of admissibility
should apply. While dangers of faulty perception or recording
may still exist, the rule requires exclusion of evidence offered
under this exception if "the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. ' 195 Thus, when
the safeguards of the rule are properly enforced, evidence of-
fered under this exception generally should be exempt from
the unavailability requirement.
G. ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD OR ENTRY
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) creates a hearsay excep-
tion for evidence in the form of a certificate or testimony that a
"diligent search failed to disclose" a particular "record, report,
statement, or data compilation, or entry," when offered to
prove its absence or to prove "the nonoccurrence or nonexis-
tence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by
a public office or agency."' 96 This exception is frequently used
by prosecutors to prove matters such as that tax returns were
not filed,197 a firearm was not registered,198 or a person was
never employed by a particular government agency1 99
When the evidence of absence of a public record or entry is
offered by means of testimony, this exception is comparable to
195. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
196. Fed. R. Evid. 803(10) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay
for evidence:
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compila-
tion, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of
which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form,
was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evi-
dence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report,
statement, or data compilation, or entry.
FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th
Cir. 1978).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Combs, 762 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1985).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 609 (1984); United States v. Maschetta, 673 F.2d 96, 100-01 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 987 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 969 (1979). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. FED. 198 (1984) (discussing ad-
missibility of absence of public record under Rule 803(10)).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(7), discussed above.20 0 The foun-
dation witness can be examined regarding the thoroughness of
the search, and the only confrontation issue relates to the as-
sertion, if any, by the record keeper regarding the nonoccur-
rence or nonexistence of the matter by the failure to record it.
Such hearsay should generally be exempt from the unavailabil-
ity requirement.
The more difficult case arises when the government at-
tempts to prove the "diligent search" for the public record or
entry by means of a certificate from the public agency, as is
permitted by the rule. Prior to Roberts, several courts approved
the introduction of such certificates over a confrontation objec-
tion without requiring production of the declarant.20 1 After
Roberts, at least one court has held the matter to be an open
question.202
Certificates offered under this exception should generally
be admissible, provided they demonstrate rather than merely
recite that the search was diligent, thereby enabling the court
to evaluate their reliability. Normally the observation being
made in the certificate is of such a simple nature that the
chance of error is minimal. In cases where the nature of the
search is complex, or the organization or maintenance of the
records is confused, courts may find the statements in the cer-
tificate to be more susceptible to testing by cross-examination
and refuse to grant an exemption from the unavailability
requirement.
H. MARKET REPORTS, COMMERCIAL PUBLICATIONS
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17) creates a hearsay excep-
tion for "market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or
other published compilations, generally used and relied upon
by the public or by persons in particular occupations. '20 3 This
exception allows the admission of evidence such as telephone
directories, city directories, newspaper stock market reports,
catalogs, and trade manuals containing valuations of goods such
as automobiles.20 4 Such reports must be of a type "relied upon
200. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
201. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 925 (1980); United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 987-89 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); United States v. Harris, 551 F.2d 621, 622 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).
202. United States v. Yakabov, 712 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1983).
203. FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
204. See id. advisory committee note.
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by the public or by persons in particular occupations, '20 5 and
this tends to give them a high degree of reliability.20 6 There are
also methods to challenge the accuracy of material in such re-
ports that are likely to be more effective than cross-examina-
tion of their preparers. Substitutes for cross-examination
include taking samples from the report and verifying their ac-
curacy, offering testimony challenging the methods of prepara-
tion or contents of the report, and offering other reports
containing contrary information. For these reasons, market re-
ports should generally be exempt from the unavailability
requirement.
The types of reports qualifying under this exception that
are most likely to conflict with the confrontation clause are
evaluative reports. The more a report consists of opinions as
distinguished from facts, the less its reliability and the greater
its susceptibility to testing by cross-examination. Furthermore,
courts are more likely to require confrontation when the re-
port, such as a credit report, pertains to a particular individual
or enterprise rather than to a market or industry as a whole.
I. LEARNED TREATISES
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) creates a hearsay excep-
tion for "statements contained in published treatises, periodi-
cals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testi-
mony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony
or by judicial notice. '20 7 Evidence may be offered under this
exception only when the statements have been "called to the
attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied
upon by him in direct examination. '20 8 Thus, before this excep-
tion may be utilized, there must always be an expert witness on
205. FED. R. EviD. 803(17).
206. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 169, § 803.17, at 863-64. Professor Michael
Graham explains:
The basis of this exception is the high degree of reliability of items of
this nature. General reliance by the public or a particular segment
thereof upon the contents of the publication reinforces the motivation
of the compiler to be accurate. Moreover no reason exists for the com-
piler to deceive. Necessity also plays a part in that in many instances
it would be virtually impossible to produce the many people each hav-
ing personal knowledge of a part of the matter compiled.
Id
207. FED. R. Evm. 803(18).
208. I&
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the stand who can be examined regarding that witness's agree-
ment or disagreement with the statements in the publication.
At common law, statements in learned treatises could be
used only for impeachment of an expert witness.20 9 Under
Rule 803(18), they may be received as substantive evidence as
well. Presumably, any potential conflict between this exception
and the confrontation clause would be obviated in a case where
the prosecutor was willing to accept a limiting instruction that
the statements in the publication were to be considered only for
purposes of impeachment.
Even where the prosecutor is unwilling to accept such a
limiting instruction, evidence offered under this exception gen-
erally should be exempt from the requirement that the prose-
cutor show the declarant is unavailable. The rule itself
requires that the publication be established as a "reliable au-
thority." There are other methods of challenging the accuracy
of statements in a publication that will often be more effective
than cross-examination of the author. They include testimony
of other experts and, particularly, introduction of contradictory
statements from other publications.
Courts may be unwilling to grant an exemption from the
unavailability requirement to all hearsay offered under this
rule because it is so broad. It allows statements not only from
treatises but also from periodicals or pamphlets, which could
have a lesser degree of reliability. Certain types of studies and
reports by government agencies or private organizations may
also be introduced under this exception.210 One way to mini-
mize potential conflict with the confrontation clause would be
for courts to apply the same restrictions to hearsay offered
under this exception that Rule 803(8) imposes upon public
records and reports.211
V. ADMISSIONS OF AGENTS AND COCONSPIRATORS
A distinct but significant question is the impact of the Rob-
erts unavailability requirement on the admissions of agents and
coconspirators.212 Roberts purports to apply to hearsay state-
209. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 321, at 900.
210. See 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 466, at 858-60.
211. See id. at 860; see also supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing admissibility of public records and reports).
212. The Supreme Court will address the issue this term. See United
States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2653 (1985)
(No. 84-1580).
The Court has not yet addressed the issue that appears to be creating
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ments, and Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E)
admits statements of agents and coconspirators because they
are "not hearsay."2 13 The categorization adopted by the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules, however, is not controlling with re-
spect to confrontation analysis. Common law generally treats
statements of agents and coconspirators as hearsay receivable
under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule,2 14 and
there is arguably greater justification for applying an unavaila-
bility requirement to such admissions than to the various cate-
gories of hearsay admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule
discussed above. Unlike the hearsay exceptions, the admissibil-
ity of statements of agents and coconspirators is not premised
on a conclusion regarding their reliability.215 Thus it is not sur-
greater division among the circuits, that is, the impact of the second prong of
the Roberts test, the reliability requirement, upon admissions of agents and co-
conspirators. The Court has held that "[r]eliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see supra text accompanying
note 10. Courts are divided regarding whether admissions of a coconspirator
qualify under this standard or whether an ad hoc reliability analysis is re-
quired. See Sanson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3559, 3559-60 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting) (denial of petition for certiorari). Compare United States v. Lurz,
666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981) (admission of statements by alleged coconspir-
ators does not violate confrontation clause), cert denied, 455 U.S. 843 (1982);
United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981) (reliability of
coconspirator's statements inferred because they fall within firmly rooted
hearsay exception), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); and Ottomano v. United
States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972) (statements of "partner in crime" ad-
missible), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973) with United States v. Ammar, 714
F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir. 1983) ("no assumption that coconspirator's statement
is per se trustworthy"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United States v. Pe-
rez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (coconspirator exception does not
automatically meet confrontation clause infirmities); United States v. Wright,
588 F.2d 31, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978) (Dutton mandates case by case examination of
possible confrontation problems), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); and United
States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 971 (1976).
213. See supra note 17.
214. 4 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 801(d)(2)[01], at 801-134
to -139. In some cases, however, statements of coconspirators are not hearsay
at all, but verbal acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. When the cocon-
spirator's statements are not being offered to prove the truth of what is as-
serted, the confrontation clause should not affect their admissibility.
215. The Advisory Committee's note to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) states:
Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of
hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result
of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of
the hearsay rule .... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in
the case of an admission.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
Of course, some statements of agents or coconspirators have a high degree
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prising that many courts and commentators have taken the po-
sition that the Roberts unavailability requirement governs the
admissions of agents and coconspirators offered under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E).216
As a practical matter, imposition of an unavailability re-
quirement upon admissions of agents and coconspirators would
have little impact in a significant percentage of cases because a
showing of unavailability often can be made. Agents of crimi-
nal defendants, and particularly coconspirators, are frequently
unlocatable, forgetful, unwilling to testify, or exempted from
testifying based on the privilege against self-incrimination.
Given the frequency with which such declarants assert the
privilege against self-incrimination, application of the unavaila-
bility requirement to admissions of agents and coconspirators
might impose a needless burden upon prosecutors, by requiring
them to bring declarants to court who obviously will assert the
privilege. The standard of unavailability set forth in Rule
804(a)(1) 217 is generally interpreted as requiring production of
any witness who claims a privilege so that the court can rule
upon the claim.218 Statements offered under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d), however, are not subject to Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a) standards of unavailability, only to constitu-
tional requirements. There is no reason why trial courts should
not have discretion to find unavailability based upon reliable
evidence other than in-court testimony establishing that the de-
clarant, if called as a witness, would assert a valid privilege.219
of reliability, and a trial court may make an ad hoc finding of reliability with
respect to a particular statement. See generally Mueller, The Federal Cocon-
spirator Exception: Action, Assertion, Hearsay, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 323, 355-
63 (1984) (discussing the reliability of coconspirator's statements).
216. See supra note 18.
217. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1), governing "Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Un-
available," defines "unavailability as a witness" to include situations in which
the declarant "is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement." FED. R. EVID.
804(a)(1).
218. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 20, § 486, at 1028; cf. supra
note 129 (discussing lack of memory as a ground for foregoing production of
declarant).
219. See United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 820 n.7 (3d Cir. 1984), cert
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2653 (1985) (No. 84-1580). There the court states:
Of course, we decide this case on the basis of the record before us,
where the declarant has not asserted the privilege before any judicial
officer or anyone authorized to take oaths. We do not deal with any
exceptional circumstance where the trial judge has a record-for ex-
ample, in the form of an affidavit-that clearly establishes that the
declarant would claim the privilege and that requiring him to appear
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A showing of unavailability can be avoided entirely in
those cases in which the statement of the agent or cocon-
spirator is one in which the defendant '"has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth. 220 Such a statement can be of-
fered as the adoptive admission of the defendant under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B), 22' and a criminal defendant, as a
matter of law, is unavailable to be called as a witness by the
prosecutor.222
The Roberts opinion notes that an exemption to the re-
quirement of showing unavailability will be recognized in those
cases in which "the utility of trial confrontation [is] remote. '223
The four criteria suggested earlier should be useful in identify-
ing such cases, although exceptionally high reliability is less
likely to be found in situations involving admissions of agents
and coconspirators. If the statement is not sufficiently central
to the prosecution's case, production of the declarant should be
unnecessary. 224 In some cases, the statement may lack suscepti-
bility to testing by cross-examination, such as when it involves
the recording of matters about which the declarant is unlikely
to have an independent, current recollection. Production of the
declarant should also be unnecessary in those cases in which
other alternatives, such as allowing impeachment of the declar-
ant by extrinsic evidence, are found to be adequate substitutes
for cross-examination.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts adds
greater certainty to the law of confrontation in situations when
the declarant is shown to be unavailable or is produced at trial.
It creates new doubts, however, concerning the constitutional
status of hearsay, admissible under established exceptions to
the rule against hearsay, when no showing of declarant unavail-
ability is made. In stating that a showing of unavailability "nor-
in court would be a meaningless formality. Thus, there is an ambit of
discretion reserved to the district judge contingent on the specific
facts of the case.
220. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(B).
221. Id Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) provides that "[a] statement is not hear-
say if. .. [t]he statement is offered against a party and is... a statement of
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth." Id
222. See supra note 20.
223. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980).
224. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970); supra text accompany-
ing notes 117-20.
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mally" will be required, the Court gave insufficient attention to
the numerous and widely used hearsay exceptions, particularly
those governing documentary hearsay, for which an unavaila-
bility requirement is generally inappropriate.
This Article has attempted to identify those exceptions and
to delineate the categories of hearsay that may be received
under them without offending the confrontation clause. It has
also described the relevant criteria to be applied to all hearsay
in determining whether an exemption from the unavailability
requirement should be recognized.
State courts and lower federal courts now have the burden
of resolving, in varying factual contexts, the tension between
the confrontation clause and evidentiary provisions admitting
hearsay without a showing of unavailability. Despite Professor
Alexander Bickel's assertion that "the lower courts can act in
constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial deci-
sion-makers only,"225 their role is likely to assume special im-
portance in developing the jurisprudence of confrontation
because of the complexity and multiform nature of hearsay
law.226 In cases in which the confrontation issue is addressed,
courts should recognize that prosecutors need clear guidelines
for determining when hearsay will be admissible in criminal
cases. Now that the standard for determining reliability has
been clarified by Roberts's presumptive equation of reliability
with "well established" hearsay exceptions,2 27 the unavailabil-
ity requirement poses the greatest area of uncertainty for pros-
225. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 198 (1962).
226. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). The Court stated:
The basic rule against hearsay . .. is riddled with exceptions devel-
oped over three centuries.... These exceptions vary among jurisdic-
tions as to number, nature and detail.... But every set of
exceptions seems to fit an apt description offered more than forty
years ago: "An old fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a
group of paintings made by cubists, futurists and surrealists."
Id (citations omitted).
Lower courts often are able to avoid the confrontation issue entirely by
interpreting the hearsay exceptions more narrowly in criminal cases. A lead-
ing authority has commented:
In a criminal case . . . the hearsay rule enjoys a "special sacrosanc-
tity," and is employed far more stringently "in spite of the repeated
judicial protestations that civil and criminal trials are governed by the
same rules of evidence." . . . [T]he trial judge's discretion to admit
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant is decidedly curtailed.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 1 800[03], at 800-18 (footnotes
omitted).
227. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see supra text accompanying
note 10.
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ecutors seeking to offer hearsay in criminal cases. With respect
to this aspect of confrontation, constitutional error is easily
avoidable if it is made clearer to prosecutors under what cir-
cumstances production of available hearsay declarants, or a
showing of their unavailability, will be required.
The greatest degree of certainty would be provided by a
rule exempting from the unavailability requirement all hearsay
qualifying for admission under designated hearsay exceptions.
Such an approach is not always possible, however, given the
wide diversity of hearsay statements that qualify for admission
under a single exception. Hearsay clearly admissible in civil
cases may fall short of sixth amendment standards.
Nonetheless, courts can provide useful precedential gui-
dance by adopting two alternate approaches. First, they can ju-
dicially define categories of hearsay that will be exempt from
the unavailability requirement, even though the identified cate-
gory may be narrower than the hearsay exception under which
it is offered. Second, they can indicate presumptive approval of
hearsay offered under specified exceptions, such as the ones
suggested in this Article, absent unusual circumstances. If
courts focus on the values underlying the confrontation clause,
as well as the need for greater future predictability, they
should be able to develop a confrontation jurisprudence that re-
sponds to the diversity and subtleties of hearsay law, without
imposing either continuing uncertainties or unnecessary evi-
dentiary burdens upon the prosecutor.
19861

